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THE LANGUAGE OF INVOLUNTARY
MENTAL HOSPITALIZATION:
A STUDY IN SOUND AND FURY
I. INTRODUCTION
Involuntary civil commitment is the business of hospitalizing
and treating, without their consent, persons whom a court, with
the aid of professional diagnosticians, determines to be psy-
chologically disturbed or mentally ill. The purpose of the present
study will be to demonstrate that the medical diagnoses of mental
illness which justify involuntary civil commitment are achieved on
the basis of at least unreliable and at worst invalid sets of diagnos-
tic categories and assessments. For the purpose of determining
the reliability of these diagnostic findings, the author selected a
representative sample of the involuntary mental hospitalization
proceedings of the Wayne County Probate Court, which serves
the metropolitan Detroit area. Before setting forth the procedure
and results, however, it is necessary to examine briefly the statu-
tory basis for involuntary mental hospitalization.
II. THE MICHIGAN CIVIL COMMITMENT STATUTE
Because the study was conducted in Michigan, particular atten-
tion will be given to the Michigan statute. Nonetheless, it should
be noted that the Michigan act is similar to those throughout the
United States, in that it requires a determination of mental illness
as a precondition to involuntary mental hospitalization.1
Under the Michigan act, involuntary mental hospitalization is
appropriate when "the condition of the person examined is such
as to require care and treatment in an institution for the care,
custody and treatment of such mentally diseased person."2 (Em-
phasis added). The probate court is authorized to issue orders for
ISee, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19-.21 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW 3H 72 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1970); CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE
§§ 6250 et seq. (West Supp. 1970); Wisc. STAT. ANN. 33 51.04-05 (Supp. 1970); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §§ 6- 1et seq. (Supp. 1970).
2 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp. 1970). Compare the California statute,
which subjects to potential judicial commitment the "mentally disordered sex
offender ... who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the
commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous to the health and
safety of others." CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §§ 6250, 6300 (West Supp. 1970). New
York has adopted the standard that "any person alleged to be mentally ill and suitable for
care and treatment" may be committed. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, § 72 (McKinney
Supp. 1970).
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the temporary and diagnostic detention of the alleged mentally ill
person in a state or otherwise licensed mental hospital for a period
of up to 240 days. 3 No such order, however, shall issue without
certification of mental illness by two physicians, who, in the case
of the diagnostic order, must be court-appointed; 4 the certificate
authorizing admission to a mental hospital must show that it is the
physician's opinion that the person is "actually mentally ill...
and shall contain the facts and circumstances upon which the
opinion of the physician is based." '5 Certification of mental
illness is prohibited simply on the basis of senility, inferred from
such signs of the "general deterioration of mental processes" as
"disorientation, confusion, or impairment of memory, ' 6 in the
absence of "[p]sychotic implications."-7 Prior to the expiration of
the diagnostic period, the superintendent of the regional diagnos-
tic and treatment center to which the alleged mentally ill person
has been sent is required to certify the results of such exam-
inations, diagnoses, prognoses for future improvement, and rec-
ommendations as have been obtained. 8 If the person is then
adjudged mentally ill by the trier of fact, a permanent order may
be issued resulting in commitment to a mental hospital for an
indefinite period. 9
Thus, the Michigan civil commitment statute, like others, is
replete with the language of mental illness, medical diagnosis, 10
3 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.19-21 (Supp. 1970).
4 Persons incarcerated in state hospitals under "temporary detention" orders were
generally examined by staff physicians, while court-appointed physicians eventually con-
ducted examinations preparatory to hearings on diagnostic orders. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 330.20 (Supp. 1970). It was not clear how the hospitals assigned patients to
examining physicians, but the author was informed that the probate judges assigned the
physicians on a rotation basis or according to personal preference as to physician. In-
terview with Leonard Edelman, Wayne County Probate Court Registrar, Oct. 15, 197 1.
5 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.19-.21 (Supp. 1970). "Physician's Certificates" are
provided by the court for this purpose. They are one-page forms allowing a space of about
six inches for the physician's entire diagnosis. Compare the New York Statute, which
authorizes, under various conditions, commitment on the certificate of one physician, two
physicians, or the county health officer or commissioner, Physician's certificates must be
accompanied by "a statement of the facts upon which the allegation of mental illness and
need for care and treatment are based." N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 72 (McKinney
Supp. 1970). The Wisconsin Law requires certification of mental illness by a physician; the
physician's statement shall describe "the illness and reasons why the patient is considered
irresponsible and dangerous." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.04 (Supp. 1970).
6 See Table 3 infra, for the extent to which these "symptoms" are cited as signs of
mental illness.
7 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.20 (Supp. 1970).
8 id. § 330.21.
9 Id. Compare the Wisconsin act, which provides that if the court or jury finds the
patient "mentally ill or infirm," the court shall commit him to a mental hospital. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 51.05 (Supp. 1970).
10 For a definitive exposition of the currently accepted psychiatric nosology, see AMERI-
CAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968). Mental illnesses are distinguished on the basis of whether they
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and hospitalization. From start to finish, the sole justification for
involuntary mental hospitalization is that a person is first alleged,
and then determined, to be "sick." The propriety of the in-
voluntary mental hospitalization process thus depends upon the
reliability and validity of these determinations.
III. THE WAYNE COUNTY PROBATE COURT STUDY
A. Focus and Objective
The study concerned cases of civil rather than criminal com-
mitment. In civil commitment proceedings, the alleged mentally ill
person has either not been charged with violating a law, or has
committed merely a petty offense; in criminal commitment pro-
ceedings, the alleged mentally ill person has either been charged
with commission of a crime and is awaiting trial or has been found
not guilty by reason of insanity.11 Criminal commitment proceed-
ings were deliberately avoided because they are generally afforded
separate and distinct treatment statutorily, and because they in-
volve theoretical considerations not within the scope of this com-
ment. In contrast, civil commitment proceedings must be justified
squarely on the basis of an inferred mental illness of sufficient
magnitude to warrant hospitalization of the subject for his and
society's welfare, whether the patient likes it or not.
Although the Michigan civil commitment statute provides that
"all the proceedings relating to diagnostic hearings and care and
intensive treatment shall also apply to persons . .. addicted to the
excessive use of intoxicating liquors, or narcotics or noxious
drugs,"1 2 the study was restricted to cases involving persons
certified as being "actually mentally ill." Proceedings officially
designated as alcoholism or narcotic addiction cases, rather than
mental illness cases, were avoided 3 because it was assumed that
their separate classification denoted diagnostic considerations ex-
traneous to those of primary concern here. With the exception of
those proceedings involving mental retardation or alleged organic
brain damage, the mental illness proceedings concerned condi-
tions of undetermined physical origin.
The purpose of the study was to determine the reliability and
are physiologically or organically derived, on the one hand, or non-organically (i.e.,
"functionally") derived, on the other. The distinguishing symptom-configuration of each
disorder is described.1 T. SZAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 40 (1963).
12 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp. 1970).
13 But see Tables 3, 4, and 5, for the degree to which drinking and drug use were cited
both as symptom and as diagnostic label.
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validity of the bases for involuntary mental hospitalization; essen-
tially, the subject of the study was the reliability and utility of the
diagnostic labels employed by the examining physicians. If per-
sons adjudged mentally ill are in fact suffering from discrete,
diagnosible diseases, then four consequences should follow: (1)
sets of diagnosticians should be able to agree on the particular
illnesses from which the patients are suffering; at least, instances
of failure to agree should be exceptional or negligible; (2) such
diseases should be inferable on the basis of discernible and re-
liable complexes of symptoms; (3) the symptom-complex of one
disease should be relatively distinct from that of another; and, (4)
each examining physician should make various diagnoses more or
less in the same proportion as every other examining physician.
Unlike somatic illness, no offending organ or organ-system has
been physically isolated as the cause of a strictly mental illness;
thus, the only basis for inferring the existence of the psychological
disease is the observable symptomatology. 14 The fact that physi-
cal or neurological bases, although undiscovered, might exist for
these illnesses is essentially irrelevant to the problem of diagnosis;
diagnosticians can employ only that information which they can
observe directly or experimentally, and they cannot observe that
which they have not yet discovered. Consistent failure of the
diagnosticians to agree, or inconsistent diagnosis rates, would
suggest an inappropriate primacy of the physicians' expectations
and predispositions. If several diseases were indicated on the
basis of precisely the same complex of symptoms, or, conversely,
if a given disease were indicated by an overlapping multiplicity of
symptoms, then there would be no basis for distinguishing among
the diseases. Given these results, the utility, not to mention the
validity, of the classification scheme would be called into serious
question, thus casting doubt upon the propriety of judicial depen-
dence on the physicians' diagnoses as a justification for in-
voluntary civil commitment and raising fundamental consid-
erations of due process.
B. Procedure
In an effort to obtain a representative and manageable sample,
all the involuntary mental hospitalization proceedings registered
14 See also W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 195 (1968).
As long as there are no identified concrete pathologies that can be tied
clearly to social behavior, speculations about them have little value for the
assessor. On the contrary, adherence to medical analogies, and labeling
people with the names of diseases whose disease properties and physiological
bases are not established, can distract the assessor from concentrating on the
psychological conditions controlling the behavior of concern.
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in volume 600 of the Wayne County Probate Court calendar were
selected; 15 volume 600, which was selected arbitrarily, catalogued
all court proceedings in which hearings were initiated between
December 19, 1969 and January 23, 1970. Subsequent hearings
on the proceedings generally continued through April or May,
1970, with a few extending into August, but these did not concern
the present study. Of the proceedings logged in volume 600, there
were 113 involving involuntary mental hospitalization and reach-
ing the point at which at least one certification examination was
conducted.16 One of the files was unavailable. The remaining 112
files were examined and provided the data for the study. 17 Par-
ticular attention was given to the physicians' certificates of mental
illness contained in the files and provided for by the Act.18 Thus,
the study essentially focused upon the phase in the proceedings at
which the diagnosticians gained initial access to the alleged men-
tally ill persons.
The following data was recorded from each file: (1) the pre-
siding judge, (2) the certifying physicians, (3) the recommenda-
tions of the certifying physicians, (4) the diagnoses of the certify-
ing physicians, (5) the symptomatology cited by the certifying
physicians, and (6) the outcome of the case. It was suspected that
there might be some variance among the rates at which the five
probate court judges entered permanent commitment orders; as it
happened, the judges, though charged with making independent
decisions, followed the advice of the regional diagnostic and treat-
ment centers in all but two cases, and the factor thus proved
irrelevant. In all, eighty physicians conducted at least one exam-
ination, with eleven physicians making 251 of the 376 physician-
diagnoses.' 9 A total of twenty-eight recognizable diagnoses
of distinct mental illnesses were made, in addition to that of "not
mentally ill." The symptoms cited fell into nineteen categories,
1" The Wayne County Probate Court serves the greater Detroit area.
16 Of the 113 cases in the sample, "permanent orders" of indefinite commitment were
entered in twenty-four cases. This outcome was a function of the recommendation of the
superintendent of the regional diagnostic and treatment center to which the alleged men-
tally ill persons were sent for observation and further diagnosis. In none of the twenty-four
cases did the superintendent recommend release. Of the eighty-nine cases in which
petitions were ultimately dismissed, the superintendent recommended entering a per-
manent order in only two cases. See vol. 600, Wayne County Probate Court calendar.
17 It should be remembered that these cases were not the court's entire civil com-
mitment caseload for the period. In addition, the court processed alcoholism and narcotic
addiction cases, as well as proceedings initiated during another month and thus listed in
another volume of the court calendar.
18 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.19-.21 (Supp. 1970).
19 Two physicians collaborated on seventy-seven "physician-diagnoses." More than one
illness was diagnosed in fifty-three "physician-diagnoses." This accounts for the dis-
crepancy between the number of diagnosed illnesses and the number of "physician-
diagnoses."
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such as depression, delusional behavior or talk, and vague, dis-
oriented, or confused behavior or talk. The results obtained are






All Physicians 376 .95
Dr. A. 67 .90
Dr. B. 33 .94
Dr. C. 26 .92
Dr. D. 26 .96
Dr. E. 16 1.00
Dr. F. 15 1.00
Dr. G. 15 .67
Dr. H. 15 1.00
Dr. I. 13 1.00
Dr. J. 13 1.00
Dr. K. 12 1.00
69 Others 125 .99
* Recommendations of further hospitalization as a percentage of total
recommendations.
** Of the eighty examining physicians, only six made even one rec-
ommendation that further hospitalization was not necessary.
C. Discussion and Results
Physicians certified mental illness and recommended hospi-
talization in ninety-five percent of the "physician-diagnoses." 20
Only six of the eighty examining physicians made even one rec-
ommendation that further hospitalization was not necessary in
any given ease. Recommendation ratios (i.e., the rate at which
each physician recommended further hospitalization) varied from
the seventy-four highs of 1.00 to a low of .67. Dr. G., who found
his patient "not mentally ill to a commitable degree" five out of
fifteen times, was the only physician to recommend further hospi-
talization in less than ninety percent of the physician-diagnoses
rendered. No doubt the subject population processed in these
actions was not a random sample of the population at large; they
20 See Table 1.
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had, at least, bothered someone sufficiently to prompt petitions for
their commitment. Nonetheless, Table 1 suggests that virtually
every alleged mentally ill person to whom the examining physi-











No Agreement**** 31 .29
* Diagnoses of "Mental Illness" and cases in which only one physi-
cian conducted an examination have been disregarded; they constituted
neither agreement nor disagreement. Had "Mental Illness" been consid-
ered a discrete diagnosis, there would have been virtually no agreement,
complete or partial.
** Complete Agreement = Complete identity of the diagnoses of all
examining physicians.
*** Partial Agreement = Identity of diagnosis of all examining physi-
cians as to one or more, but not all, diagnosed illnesses (instances of no
or only one diagnosis exclusive of "Mental Illness" considered "Partial
Agreement").
**** No Agreement = No identity as to any diagnosed illness by all
examining physicians.
If the physicians are in general agreement as to the almost
universal need for involuntary mental hospitalization manifested
by their examined patients, they are nonetheless unable to agree
among themselves as to why such hospitalization is necessary. 21
Agreement between and among examining physicians as to the
proper diagnosis in a given case was very poor;. in fact, complete
consensus as to diagnosis could be reached in only one case out of
five, and the physicians' examinations resulted in total diagnostic
disagreement in almost three cases out of ten. 22
21 See Table 2.
22 These findings substantiate the conclusions reached in Ash, The Reliability of Psy-
chiatric Diagnoses, 44 J. ABNORM. SOC. PSYCHOL. 272 (1949). Seventeen subjects were
interviewed for diagnostic purposes by two psychiatrists, and thirty-five were interviewed
WINTER 19701
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Theoretically, a diagnostic category is defined by a particular
symptom-configuration which distinguishes it from other diagnos-
tic categories. It might be expected that as the reliability of the
categories decreases, the extent of overlap in the symptom-
atologies would increase correspondingly. This is precisely what
occurred in the study.2 3 There was little or no homogeneity in the
classification of symptoms according to a diagnosed illness.
2 4
Thus, even though some symptoms were cited in a high per-
centage of cases of persons diagnosed as having particular ill-
nesses, the same symptoms were nonetheless cited as evidence of
from five to twenty-two different diseases; the average number of
diseases eventually inferred from each symptom was 12.9. Con-
versely, the existence of a given disease was inferred on the basis
of an overly broad and overlapping array of symptoms.
A few examples from Table 3 are illuminating. It should come
as no surprise that while the symptom "narcotic addiction or use"
was cited with regularity to support the diagnosis "drug addiction
or use," the same symptom supported the inference of fifteen
other diseases. In the same manner, such "symptoms" as hostility
and aggressiveness, depression, delusions or hallucinations, bi-
zarre talk or behavior, vagueness, disorientation, confusion, lack
of judgment or insight, and inappropriate affect (the most
frequently cited symptoms) were each indicative of the possibility
of at least seventeen different diseases. Of course, the physicians
may be employing symptomalogical labels such as disorientation
or bizarre talk as shorthand for a variety of descriptively discrete
phenomena. But that would only underscore the lack of
homogeneity of the symptom-labels and the need for the diagnos-
ticians to use language which does in fact "contain the facts and
by three psychiatrists. The psychiatrists were asked to diagnose each subject according to
five "major categories" and sixty specific subcategories. The seventeen psychiatric pairs
agreed as to major category in fifty-eight to sixty-seven percent of the cases and as to
specific subcategory in thirty-one to forty-four percent of the cases. The thirty-five triads
agreed on forty-six percent of the major categories and on only twenty percent of the
specific subcategories. But see Schmidt & Fonda, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diag-
nosis:A New Look, 52 J. ABNORM. SOC. PSYCHOL. 262 (1956) in which greater diagnostic
agreement among pairs of psychiatrists was obtained.
23 See Table 3.
24 "Homogeneity of classification" refers to the uniformity, uniqueness, or dis-
tinguishability of behavior (symptoms) subsumed within a given diagnostic category. See
Zigler & Phillips, Psychiatric Diagnosis and Symptomatology, 63 J. ABNORM. SOC. PsY-
CHOL. 69 (1961). The case histories of 793 patients admitted to a state hospital over a
period of twelve years were studied; the diagnoses were divided into four major categories
(manic-depressive, psychoneurotic, character disorder, and schizophrenia) and thirty-five
different symptoms were catalogued. Thirty of the symptoms appeared in the cases
"manic-depressive," thirty-four in those labeled "character disorder," and all thirty-five
appeared in the "psychoneurotic" and "schizophrenia" cases. Zigler and Phillips con-
cluded that the relationships between symptoms and diagnoses yielded by the diagnostic
system were so minimal as to be without utility.
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circumstances upon which the opinion of the physician is based,"
as the statute explicitly requires.
25
By the same token, seventeen of the nineteen symptoms ap-
peared in the diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia, sixteen in
acute schizophrenia, eighteen in organic brain syndrome, and
fourteen in depressive reaction. Not surprisingly, all nineteen
symptoms were eventually cited to substantiate the diagnoses
designating only "mental illness." Thus, the inclusion of a patient
within a particular diagnostic group conveyed only minimal in-
formation concerning the symptomatology of the patient; con-
versely, a particular set of symptoms did not allow a reliable
prediction as to the diagnostic label that would ultimately be
appended to the patient.
Because the judges assigned physicians on a rotation basis or
according to personal preference as to physician, 26 it should fol-
low that the court-appointed physicians should have made various
diagnostic designations in more or less the same proportions.
This, however, did not occur. 27 For example, Dr. A. made only
twenty-five percent of the total diagnoses, but he accounted for
fifty-six percent of the sixteen diagnoses of acute schizophrenia,
fifty-four percent of the forty-eight diagnoses of paranoid
schizophrenia, and forty-five percent of the twenty diagnoses of
depressive reaction. Dr. B., who made fourteen percent of the
total diagnoses, accounted for fifty-two percent of the diagnoses
of organic brain syndrome and sixty-three percent of the diag-
noses of mental retardation. Finally, Dr. D. made only nine
percent of the diagnoses, but was responsible for twenty-one
percent of the cases labeled chronic undifferentiated schizoph-
renia and thirty-five percent of those labeled depressive reaction.
Thus, the diagnosis reached in a given case appeared, in part, to
be a function of the hypothetical constructs and predispositions of
the physicians.
These findings suggest that, to a substantial degree, the diag-
noses and recommendations of examining physicians in in-
voluntary civil commitment proceedings of the alleged mentally ill
reflect a procedure where obscure and questionable labels are
offered by diagnosticians and accepted by the court as conclusive
of the underlying malady. Although many of those brought before
2 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.20 (Supp. 1970), and note 30 infra. For examples of
statutes using similar language see N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 72 (McKinney Supp.
1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.04 (Supp. 1970).
26 See note 4 supra.
27 See Table 5. No inferences can be made regarding the staff physicians, since they
virtually always designated their patients as being merely "mentally ill" on the court-
provided physician's certificates.
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* As a percentage of total diagnosed illnesses.
** Exclusive of those merely designated "Mental Illness."
the court in civil commitment proceedings are undoubtedly
suffering from such severe disorders that involuntary in-
stitutionalization might arguably be appropriate, it is clearly in-
appropriate to do so on the basis of grossly undescriptive labels
rather than the specific conduct or data upon which the examining
physician formulated his diagnoses. Those who choose to specify
a diagnostic label beyond the general designation "mental illness"
are often inclined to see particular illnesses in an inordinate num-
ber of cases (Table 5). All this is made possible by a diagnostic
scheme which allows the inference of practically any disease on
the basis of practically any symptom configuration (Table 3).
Much of the difficulty derives from the nature of the symptom-
atology which is employed. Theoretically, a symptom is an ob-
servable, objective datum,2 8 which is taken as a sign of an under-
28 Note that the data with which the diagnostician has to work includes the verbal report
of the patient. Thus, for example, the physician may note that the patient reports (an
observable) that a particular stimulus is accompanied by pain even though the pain itself is
not observable. The distinction is crucial in relation to such symptoms as "delusions." The
patient may report that he is a narcotics informer (an observable) but the transmutation of
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lying mental condition; since the underlying condition is not ob-
servable directly, as a ruptured appendix might be, for example, it
must be inferred from the observable symptom. The only reliable
basis for inferring the existence of the illness is that under particu-
lar circumstances, a consistent and homogeneous symptom con-
figuration can be observed.
In practice, however, the symptomatology is treated in a quite
different manner. Consider a typical example of one of Dr. A.'s
certificates of mental illness:
[Patient] ... is confused. She answers questions in a rambling
and incoherent manner. She is hallucinated. [Examples are
quoted similar or identical to those quoted in other cases
diagnosed by Dr. A.]. She is delusional with ideas of per-
secution. [Further examples cited, also in quotation marks,
also similar or identical to others]. Her affect is in-
appropriate. Her insight and judgment are lacking. Patient
has schizophrenia-paranoid type. Hospitalization and treat-
ment are indicated. 29 [Emphasis added].
The aforementioned formula constituted a familiar recitation, con-
sistently found in Dr. A.'s diagnoses. Vague, conclusory labels
were treated as though they were symptoms, despite the theo-
retical objectivity symptoms are supposed to possess.3 0 The "ap-
propriateness" of "affect" (i.e., emotional demeanor, quality of
responses) is a matter of subjective interpretation. Given the role
of context and personal value judgment in determining "appro-
priateness," it is unlikely that any behavior is so inherently appro-
priate that deviation from it is a per se sign of literal and tangible
disease. Furthermore, there are no objective, consistent standards
by which it can be determined when "judgment" is lacking. Such
determinations risk the injection of the diagnostician's personal
values for comparative purposes. Thus, the validity of equating
his value structure with a state of good health is dubious. Finally,
it has been argued that "lack of insight" is really psychiatric
29 The symptoms and final diagnosis have been emphasized. The probate court would
not permit reference to cases by name or file number and thus direct footnoting cannot be
made.
30 But see Hanneman v. Medical Superintendent of Mount Pleasant State Home and
Training School, 336 Mich. 316, 58 N.w.2d 90 (1953), in which the Michigan Supreme
Court held that pursuant to the statutory requirement of physicians' examinations and
certification, facts, not mere conclusions must be set forth. In Hanneman, statements that
an alleged mentally ill person was a "low grade type," could not answer simple questions,
and would never be of greater mental capacity or be able to support himself or be safe
without watching were all mere conclusions and therefore insufficient to support a com-
mitment order. See also In re Opal, 360 Mich. 696, 104 N.W.2d 802 (1960), in which
allegations of listlessness and apparent loss of memory were held to be "conclusory" and
insufficient to support a commitment order.
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shorthand for "refusal to accept the doctor's view." 3' In this
context, "lack of insight" may well be the patient's refusal to
accept the doctor's advice to volunteer for commitment. Failure
of the patient to accept the physician's construct of the patient's
condition is taken, in a markedly circular fashion, as further proof
of the patient's disease.
Nor is it always clear when a patient's verbal report is "delu-
sional." In one case, the certifying physician observed that the
patient, drug addicted, thought that he was an informer for the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, commissioned to "infiltrate" the
ghetto for the purpose of bringing to light addicts and pushers.
Anyone familiar with the line of cases arising out of On Lee3
2
would know that such an assertion is perfectly plausible. Yet the
notion was apparently so foreign to the physician's experience
that she labeled it "delusional," and on the basis of the label,
inferred the existence of an underlying pathology. This is not to
suggest that there do not exist persons who are delusional or that
the examining physician might not have been correct in this case.
The example is cited only to illustrate the extremely interpretive
nature of the act of designating a verbal report as delusional and
the danger of mistake as a result of the diagnostician's ex-
perience.33 The circularity of the process is underscored by the
fact that the more a hypothetical patient might protest that he is in
fact a Narcotics Bureau informer, the more he would be deemed
to lack "insight" into his true condition; this would be taken as a
further "symptom" of the patient's illness. 3 4
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The present study suggests that, under prevailing circum-
stances, involuntary mental hospitalization is at least the in-
evitable temporary outcome of a process which allows the in-
ference of practically any conceivable mental disease on the basis
of practically any conceivable symptom-configuration. It should
follow, then, that involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill,
3 1 T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY 132 (1970).3 2 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
33See A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 3 (1969). "Since symp-
tom labeling primarily reflects the evaluative responses that a given behavior evokes from
others, rather than distinguishable qualities of the behavior itself, an identical response
pattern may be viewed as a pathological derivative or as wholesome behavior by persons
whose judgmental orientations differ."
3 The questionable nature of what is characterized as "delusional" is further illustrated
by another case, in which a young male patient's assertions that "the boys pick on me" and
"the principal doesn't believe me" were taken, per se, to be delusional feelings of
persecution.
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premised on diagnostic labels of such questionable reliability and
validity, is without sufficient legal justification and should be
considered a deprivation of liberty without due process of law in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The physi-
cians' certificates of mental illness clearly do not live up to the
statutory requirement that facts, rather than mere conclusions,
shall be set forth to justify involuntary civil commitment. More-
over, one reading of the present study could support the position
of those behavioral psychologists who maintain that abnormal
behavior is a function of social learning experiences rather than
mediating pathological agents within the individual.3 5 Szasz ar-
gues that involuntary civil commitment is used, not as a means of
according treatment to persons in need of it, but rather as a
mechanism for socially isolating those members of society whose
presence, for one reason or another, is highly upsetting or in-
convenient, but for whose behavior no crime can be found.3 6 It
has been observed that
[a] crucial consideration is the issue of social disturbance. If a
person is old and cannot care for himself, he creates a social
disturbance and may be committed. If a person threatens to
kill himself-but does not do so-he too creates a social
disturbance and, in a way, asks to be committed. If a person
lays claim to ideas or beliefs or sensations that threaten
society-for example, beliefs of being persecuted (called "de-
lusions"), or sensations of seeing and hearing (called "halluci-
nations")-he too creates a social disturbance and may be
committed. Finally, if a person commits acts which violate
social rules-for example, by engaging in forbidden modes of
sexual gratification- he too creates a social disturbance and
may be committed.3
7
Society will not tolerate the incarceration of persons merely be-
cause they are annoying or disquieting, but will readily hospitalize
"for his own good" a person upon whom it appends the label
"sick." In this way, the incarceration of disturbing social devia-
tors is legitimized. In general,
that conduct tends to lead to commitment which appears
abnormal to the layman. Such crudely offensive social behav-
ior cannot, however, be readily correlated with psychiatric
diseases. Nevertheless, psychiatrists tend to label this sort of
behavior psychotic. Thus, the expressions 'psychosis' and
35 See W. MISCHEL, supra note 14 and A. BANDURA, supra note 33; Accord, T. SZASZ,
THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
36 T. SZASZ, supra note 35, and supra note 11.
37
id. supra note I1, at 47.
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'behavior justifying commitment' overlap, and in effect often
mean the same thing. Indeed, persons whom psychiatrists
may consider psychotic are usually left undisturbed so long as
they do not annoy others.38
Szasz thus contends that the problem is not merely the labels
presently used by physicians in civil commitment proceedings, but
rather the inadequate theoretical foundation which underlies these
labels. Incarceration of persons solely because they are in-
convenient or unwanted, or because their behavior is strange or
offbeat, or because they are frightening and feared potentially
dangerous has never been condoned.3 9 It is incontestable that
persons can be, and have been, constricted and debilitated by a
bewildering array of fears, behavioral deficits, and inconvenient,
time-consuming or inappropriate behaviors and thoughts; it has
also been demonstrated that such persons can benefit from a
variety of therapeutic procedures. 40 These behavioral psycho-
therapists, however, have for some time asserted that consent is
vital to the therapeutic effectiveness of any program of behavior
change. 41
Thus, asserting that involuntary civil commitment of the men-
tally ill is grounded on a questionable and possibly invalid view of
human behavior (i.e., that these behaviorally disturbed persons
are "sick"), Szasz has proposed that involuntary civil com-
mitment be abolished altogether.42 There is, however, no reason
why a hospital might not, under the proper circumstances, be the
locus of a therapeutic program of behavior change voluntarily
embarked upon by a disturbed individual and his therapist. Thus,
hospitalization of adults in private and public mental institutions
should be completely voluntary, and the patient should not suffer
the loss of legal rights traditionally associated with the com-
mitment process. 4 3 Moreover, a person convicted of a crime could
be subjected to involuntary mental hospitalization for a period not
S8Id. at 46-47. See also Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1969) in which the
Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the state could commit for
observation those persons reasonably believed "to be suffering from mental disease, the
result of which may be grossly antisocial behavior." Id. at 472.
'9 See In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1958). Even if a person is diagnosed as
mentally ill, potential dangerousness was held not sufficient to satisfy a statutory dan-
gerousness standard.40 
A. BANDURA, supra note 33.
41 See, e.g., James, Case of Homosexuality Treated by Aversion Therapy, 1 BRIT. MED.
J. part i, 768 (1962), for the proposition that therapy conducted involuntarily, particularly
through court referral, presents the worst prognostic condition and least likelihood of
fulfillment of therapeutic objectives.
42 T. SZASZ, supra note II, at 226-27.
43 Id.
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to exceed the maximum sentence for the crime involved,44 since
the alternative would be an equally involuntary confinement-
imprisonment. But as discussed above, such modes of criminal
commitment are to be distinguished from the types of civil com-
mitment envisioned in the Michigan act and examined in the
study.
It cannot be ignored that the likelihood of any state in the near
future abolishing involuntary mental hospitalization is, to say the
least, extremely remote. There has been, and most likely will
continue to be, considerable pressure to retain a socially accept-
able mechanism for the care and rehabilitation of those individuals
who are determined by psychiatrists to have serious psychological
disorders. It is the function of society and the law, however, to
determine whether a particular type of illness or disorder is
serious enough to warrant involuntary commitment.
This alternative, contrary to Szasz, reflects what is probably
the more generally accepted view that serious psychological dis-
orders susceptible of descriptive diagnostic analysis do exist, and
in severe cases require involuntary hospitalization. The problem
here is the need for the examining physician to articulate fully and
clearly the facts and circumstances which support his diagnosis of
an illness of sufficient gravity to warrant institutionalization.
An initially crucial step toward decreasing the number of in-
nocuous but unwanted persons committed would be to require
that an alleged mentally ill person be proven "dangerous to him-
self or others"' 5 as a condition precedent to involuntary com-
4See the New Jersey Sex Offender Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 164-6(b) (1953),
which permits treatment of convicted sex offenders for a period of confinement not to
exceed the maximum sentence for the crime involved.
4State statutes requiring dangerousness as a precondition to at least one variety of
involuntary mental hospitalization include CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §§ 6250, 6300
(West Supp. 1970); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 81-31 (Supp. 1965) (for emergency hospi-
talization only); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2902 (Supp. 1970): MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 12
(Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253A.01 et seq. (Supp. 1970) (for emergency hospi-
talization only); Miss. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 6909-01 et seq. (1953); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 202.803 (Supp. 1970) (for emergency hospitalization only); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 38-201 et seq. (1961); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 433.653, 433.671 et seq., 433.685 et seq.
(1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58 et seq. (Supp. 1969) (for emergency hospitalization
only); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03-07 et seq. (1970) (for emergency procedure only); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 et seq. (Page 1970) (for emergency hospitalization only); TEX.
Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 92, § 5547-28 (1958) (for emergency procedure only); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 71.02.010 et seq. (1959); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-522 et seq., 21-541 et
seq. (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.04-51.05 (Supp. 1969) (for emergency hospitalization
only). A larger group of statutes excludes a dangerousness requirement altogether. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 324 (Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-232 (Supp. 1969), ch.
186, §§ 71-1-4 et seq.; [1965] COLO. SEss. LAWS 739; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-176
et seq. (Supp. 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch 91 1/2, §§ 6-1, 7-1 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 22-1201 et seq. (Supp. 1969); IowA CODE ANN. §§229.1 et seq. (1969); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28:52, 28:53, 28:57 (1969); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp.
1970); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-325 et seq. (Supp. 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135:15
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mitment. The present procedure should be further changed so that
the certifying physician or diagnostician would be required to set
forth the specific reasons why the patient should be hospitalized
rather than simply reciting labels which seem to be mere con-
clusions, at best vague and nondescriptive.4 6 Such a requirement
would presumably impose a greater evidentiary burden upon the
petitioning party which would provide an additional safeguard
against the possibility of institutionalizing persons who are not
sufficiently disturbed to warrant involuntary commitment.
A statutory dangerousness requirement and an increased
evidentiary burden would be empty, however, without the full
panoply of procedural guarantees. Although the United States
Supreme Court has not rendered a decision precisely on point, it
has found the rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, and
cross-examination applicable to juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings.4 7 Lower courts have, however, held that procedural due
process must be observed in commitment proceedings, 48 and that
denial of counsel4 9 and lack of opportunity to cross-examine wit-
et seq. (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-23 et seq. (Supp. 1970); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE
LAW, § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 3,51 et seq. (Supp.
1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4404 et seq. (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 40-20-1 et
seq. (1969); S.D. CODE §§ 27-1-1, 27-7-1 et seq., 27-8-1 et seq. (1967); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 37.1-67 (1970). A third group requires either dangerousness or lack of sufficient insight
or capacity to make a responsible decision concerning hospitalization. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. §§ 47.30.030, 47.30.070 (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-501 et seq. (Supp.
1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5125 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.204 (Supp.
1970); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-506-507 (Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 66-317 et seq.
(Supp. 1969); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 202.010 et seq. 210.280 (5) (1962); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34, §§ 2331 et seq. (1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 1, 50 et seq. (1965);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.07 (Supp. 1970) (for all but emergency hospitalization); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2-1 et seq. (1954); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03-07 et seq. (1970) (for all
but emergency hospitalization); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.01 et seq. (Page 1970)
(for all but emergency hospitalization); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-9 11, 32-954 et seq. (1962);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-602 et seq. (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-7-33, 64-7-36
(1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7101, 7504, 7601 et seq. (1968), W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-1-2, 27-5-1 (1966), WYo. STAT. ANN. § § 25-49 et seq. (1967).
46 See cases cited in note 30 supra.
47 In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967). It may be argued that involuntary hospitalization
proceedings, like juvenile delinquency proceedings, are quasi-criminal in nature.
48 See. e.g., Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965): Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d
393 (10th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 355 Mass. 479, 245 N.E.2d 429 (1969).
49 Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968), at 396, held that the Wyoming
statute permitting representation of counsel at civil commitment proceedings did not
adequately meet the demands of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court declared that "Fourteenth Amendment due process requires that the infirm
person, or one acting in his behalf, be fully advised of his rights and be accorded each of
them unless knowingly and understandingly waived." Heryford thus appears to stand alone
in holding that, unless knowingly waived, the right to counsel is guaranteed at civil
commitment proceedings.
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nesses or contravert the effect of evidence 50 violates due process.
Scrupulously making counsel available to alleged mentally ill per-
sons would insure that petitioners' evidentiary burden, factually
based, would be met as a precondition to involuntary mental
hospitalization. Hopefully, such guarantees would do much to
prevent civil commitment on the basis of conduct whose only
wrong is that it is bizarre, unsettling, inconvenient, frightening, or
unpopular.
V. A POSTSCRIPT
On February 17, 1970, following a consultation with an alleged
mental incompetent, the chief of staff of a Detroit area hospital
sent the following letter to the former's attorney.
I understand that Mr. __ is to appear at a hearing on _ at
which time a decision may be made to commit him in-
voluntarily to an institution. I believe this would be a griev-
ous error as well as a serious miscarriage of justice. If he is
guilty of a crime then let him be prosecuted for that. Com-
mitment to a mental institution would be tantamount to per-
secution.
The court-appointed examining physician subsequently labelled
Mr. schizophrenic, paranoid type.
-Steven H. Levinson
50 Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965).
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